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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default 
rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, 
these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek 
to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions.1 In settings where 
these costs are high, parties might find themselves “stuck” in a 
default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. 
 The strong version of this account—that the only factor that can 
make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a 
tailored provision—has been gradually reappraised.2 It is by now 
recognized that factors beyond drafting costs might also cause parties 
to stick with an undesirable default rule; that is, parties might 
choose not to opt out of a legal default even when a better provision 
can easily be identified and articulated at a negligible drafting cost. 
While this “stickiness” of defaults has been identified before in 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professors, University of Michigan Law School. We are grateful to Robert Ahdieh, 
Amitai Aviram, Phoebe Ellsworth, Franco Ferrari, Mitu Gulati, Robert Scott, Guy Rub, 
James J. White, and Frank Yates, as well as participants at the Florida State University 
College of Law Symposium on Default Rules in Private and Public Law and the Michigan 
faculty seminar for helpful comments. We also thank Mike Murphy, Ali Rabbani, and Ming 
Shui for research assistance. 
 1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (6th ed. 2003) (“[C]ontract 
law cannot readily be used to achieve goals other than efficiency. A ruling that fails to 
interpolate the efficient term will not affect future conduct; it will be reversed by the 
parties in their subsequent dealings. It will only impose additional—and avoidable—
transaction costs.”). This intuitive proposition was developed in the early work of Goetz 
and Scott. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and 
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default 
Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 94 n.4 (2003) (“[C]hoosing a default rule on the basis of some 
normative conception of fairness would be wrong, in the sense that it would not increase 
the amount of fair contracts in the world, but it would increase the amount of contracting 
costs.”). 
 2. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis 
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 263 
(1985).  
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discrete contexts,3 the purpose of this Article is to suggest that its 
pervasiveness may be even broader than previous accounts have 
predicted.  
 The core intuition is simple. In the presence of a default rule—or, 
more precisely, in the presence of a familiar and commonly utilized 
background provision, be it a common law doctrine, a business norm, 
or a boilerplate contractual term4—a transactor might fear that 
proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his potential 
counterparty from entering into the agreement. The fear is that the 
counterparty will suspect that the proposer’s decision to deviate from 
the norm and use an unfamiliar provision hides some unknown 
problem: in short, that it is a “trick.” The counterparty, seeking to 
rationalize why the deviation was proposed, may construct a negative 
account and attribute some undesirable reason for the departure by 
the proposer. Depending on the plausibility of the imputed negative 
account, the counterparty will either exact an offsetting discount or 
avoid entering into the contract altogether. 
 Consider the following example. An author submits her 
manuscript to a publisher or a law review. Suppose the common 
practice (the “default”) is for her to offer the manuscript on an 
exclusive basis. An author who opts out of the practice and offers to 
submit to multiple publishers concurrently may be viewed adversely, 
and her chances to publish the manuscript might be diminished. 
Aside from begrudging the negative direct value of having to compete 
against other publishers, a reviewer might make a host of negative 
inferences about the author: that she is insecure about the quality 
and the appeal of the manuscript, that she disregards editorial norms 
and is difficult to work with, perhaps even that the quality of the 
manuscript is inferior.  
 But what if the default is the opposite, and publishers allow and 
expect multiple concurrent submissions? How would a publisher view 
an author who opts out and offers exclusive submission of a 
manuscript? We argue that although there is positive direct value to 
avoiding competition with other publishers, a reviewing publisher 
might still make a negative inference about the proposal: that the 
author is desperate and does not think she can publish the 
manuscript elsewhere so is trying gimmicks, that the author is 
unpredictable and is difficult to work with, perhaps even that the 
study lacks timeliness and so the author sees no urgency to 
                                                                                                                      
 3. For a discussion of “stickiness” in several contexts, see Jason Scott Johnston, 
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 
615 (1990). 
 4. For a discussion of the similarities between these terms, see generally Michael 
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 
(1995). 
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publication. In short, no matter what the default practice is, a 
proposal to opt out of it can raise a host of suspicions. Anticipating 
these suspicions, an offeror may adhere to the default and suppress 
any desire to deviate or experiment. 
 Opt-out proposals may differ widely in terms of the direct value to 
the offeree. Apart from the associated learning costs,5 a proposed opt-
out can have positive, negative, or neutral “direct value” to the 
offeree. That is, some terms may have positive direct value to the 
recipient, meaning that, other things being equal, a rational offeree 
would pay to have the term included in the contract and adjust the 
price favorably. A seller’s proposed warranty of satisfaction would be 
such an example. Similarly, it is easy to imagine terms whose direct 
value is negative to a recipient, such as a seller’s proposed as is/no 
refunds condition. In theory, then, a deviant proposed term should be 
rationally priced by the counterparty, with either an upward or 
downward adjustment based on direct value. 
 But when an unfamiliar term is proposed, other things may not be 
equal. Due to the unfamiliarity of the term itself, its recipient may 
impose an effective penalty in the form of an additional, negative 
adjustment. Indeed, a principal claim of this Article is that the 
contractual phenomenon we might loosely refer to as “deviance 
avoidance” may even apply to proposals which, by the objective direct 
value of their content, should be seen as good for the counterparty, 
that is, when the departure from the default is genuinely favorable to 
the recipient of the proposal. 
 To be sure, not all default rules and terms are sticky. Many types 
of complex transactions are tailored term by term, and in those 
settings the content of untailored default rules plays little role. 
Stickiness, this Article argues, is more likely to be an impediment to 
opt-outs in situations where it is uncommon for other market 
participants to negotiate a tailored provision, that is, where the 
background rules and templates are well entrenched and commonly 
employed.6 Moreover, there are various other forces, apart from the 
one discussed here, that can render a default provision sticky, such 
as learning effects, network externalities, interpretive risk, and 
more.7 The purpose of this Article is neither to unbundle them nor 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of 
Contract-Reading Costs, 1 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2001), http://www.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=bejeap. 
 6. The argument is not that stickiness can be inferred from the existence of 
uniformity in the adherence to the background default—this would be a tautology. Rather, 
the argument is that the more prevalent the adherence of other contractors to the 
background default, the more costly it becomes for a party to propose a deviant term. 
 7. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) 
(discussing network externalities and learning effects); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory 
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rank their importance. It is to suggest that the resulting stickiness 
from the combination of these and other forces may be more robust 
than often appreciated. 
 To explore the stickiness of default rules, this Article employs the 
following technique. It identifies and examines situations in which 
two sets of jurisdictions take opposite approaches with respect to the 
default rule they apply to a specific issue of contract law. In these 
situations, if the defaults are sufficiently divergent and if we assume 
that it is impossible for both default rules to be equally efficient, then 
we should expect (as our null hypothesis) that in one set of these 
jurisdictions—but not the other—parties will systematically opt out 
of the default more prevalently, particularly if the transaction costs 
involved are predicted to be low. If, instead, parties stick with the 
default in both sets of jurisdictions, regardless of that rule’s content, 
then such contracting behavior must indicate the additional costs 
associated with deviance avoidance. 
 The Article focuses on three examples. The first example looks at 
the rules governing the revocability of contractual offers. It shows 
that there is significant variance across jurisdictions in defining the 
right to revoke offers. It also shows that there were important 
changes to this doctrine within jurisdictions over time. But there is 
no evidence that opting out became more prevalent in one 
jurisdiction (or time period) based upon the content of the default 
rule regarding revocability. The second example looks at the rules 
governing the termination of employment contracts—the at-will 
versus for-cause doctrines—and again argues that there is no 
evidence of greater incidence of opt-out under one regime versus the 
other. Finally, a third example examines the drafting of boilerplate 
contracts in a specific sector: bond covenants. It discusses a study 
that demonstrates how surprise changes in the substantive legal 
interpretation by courts of terms in these contracts did not produce 
responsive redrafting. 
 Part II of this Article reviews the prior accounts of default 
stickiness that have developed the intuition underlying this analysis. 
Part III discusses the larger phenomenon of stickiness that can be 
pieced together with those prior accounts and offers additional 
conjecture regarding the mechanisms at work. Part IV presents the 
three examples of stickiness of default rules to support the claim that 
the problem of stickiness is pervasive. Part V concludes.  
                                                                                                                      
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998) 
(interpretive externalities). 
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II.   PRIOR ACCOUNTS OF STICKINESS 
 This Article is not the first to identify the stickiness of legal 
default rules in contracts, nor is it the first to argue that parties 
might sometimes leave contracts “economically incomplete” (that is, 
leave some contracts ungoverned by terms that are Pareto optimal), 
even when the direct transaction costs of identifying specific 
arrangements for some important contingencies are low. For 
example, Russell Korobkin conducted a series of experiments 
(discussed in more detail below) on first-year law students exploring 
whether the psychological phenomenon sometimes known as the 
“endowment effect” leads parties to attach disproportionate utility to 
legal default rules as the status quo.8 Korobkin hypothesized that the 
same cognitive bias that underlies individuals’ preferences for 
maintaining the status quo with respect to physical items also 
generates a bias for legal defaults.9 If the legal default is perceived as 
an entitlement with similar attributes to, say, a coffee mug (the 
physical item used in many endowment effect experiments),10 then 
individuals will be less inclined to opt out of them. His findings do, 
indeed, lend support to the conclusion that human beings are 
cognitively disposed to prefer a default legal rule in contractual 
negotiations, irrespective of the content of that legal rule.11 
 Korobkin also ran follow-up studies to probe further the apparent 
bias toward the status quo.12 For example, what happens when the 
default rule changes? Would status quo preferers seek out the old 
default rule (to return to comfortingly familiar territory), or would 
they prefer the new default rule (to remain passive in the face of an 
opportunity to opt out)?13 The data from his follow-up trials led 
Korobkin to conclude that it is the latter, for which he offers a 
cognitive bias explanation: the attractive role of inaction in the 
service of “regret avoidance” by decisionmakers.14 He calls this 
account the “inertia theory.”15 
 Even if one takes Korobkin’s studies as consistent with a 
psychological attachment to default arrangements, the question 
                                                                                                                      
 8. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 608 (1998). 
 9. Id. at 611-12. 
 10. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-7 (2002).  
 11. See Korobkin, supra note 8, passim. 
 12. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The 
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998). 
 13. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and 
Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 197-99 (disaggregating various 
psychological forces that render the status quo attractive). 
 14. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1621-24. 
 15. Id. at 1586; see also infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text. 
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remains as to the strength and nature of this effect. Korobkin 
examined the preferences of individuals toward a favorable legal 
rule. He found that they would demand more to give up the rule 
when it was framed as a default legal entitlement than they would 
pay to acquire the rule when it was not framed as a default.16 But his 
studies that measure abstract pricing preferences when framing is 
manipulated may not fully capture the dynamic, interactive nature of 
contract negotiation. Consider in this regard the example of a written 
proposal in which a default term is crossed out (for example, an offer 
presented as a boilerplate contract with a standard clause explicitly 
and conspicuously altered and replaced by the opposite 
arrangement). Do recipients, following Korobkin’s inertia theory, 
prefer to remain passive and avoid regret by accepting the penciled-
in alteration as proposed by the offeror (as the “framed” status quo)? 
Or do they prefer to send back the offer with a counterproposal 
reverting to the crossed-out term (returning to the “default” status 
quo)? Korobkin’s results tend to suggest that they prefer the latter,17 
which strikes us as plausible. We are not sure, however, that this 
strategy reflects an exhibition of inertia. Inertia alone, it seems, 
cannot fully explain the attraction of default rules. 
 Taking an economic perspective, Lisa Bernstein offers another 
explanation for the attachment of parties to default rules, based on 
social norms and negotiation strategy.18 She explores the possibility 
that parties form adverse judgments when they encounter proposals 
to alter default norms in negotiating contracts.19 She further predicts 
that these “costs” to deviate depend upon the type of contract at 
issue. They are likely enhanced in situations where repeat 
interaction is required over the course of the contractual 
relationship:  
Relational factors may also affect the cost of contracting around 
default rules. In transactional settings where informal norms are 
an important part of the parties’ contracting relationship, a party 
may be reluctant to suggest varying a particular default rule even 
if the “direct transaction costs” are low and the variation would 
make both parties better off.20 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1621; see also Korobkin, supra note 8, at 637-47. 
 17. Korobkin, supra note 8, at 637-47; see also infra notes 87-100 and accompanying 
text (discussing Korobkin’s findings).  
 18. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993). 
 19. See id. at 71-72. 
 20. Id. at 70. Earlier implicit recognition of this idea appears in Stewart Macaulay’s 
work of the 1960s on commercial norms. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963); see also 
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465.  
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Bernstein believes such costs can be reconciled within the Coasian 
framework by arguing that costs (and also benefits) of opt-out cover a 
wider sweep than lawyers’ fees. Thus, implicit in Bernstein’s account 
is the idea that a party who varies a particular default rule is 
regarded by her counterpart as a more likely violator of the informal 
cooperative norms that discipline participants’ behavior and the idea 
that such a negative perception can be costly. As a consequence, 
deviant proposals are shied away from in the negotiation of long-
term contracts.21 
 Taking a similar but more rigorous approach, economist Kathryn 
Spier indirectly touches upon the persistence of default contract 
terms in her theory regarding why some contracts remain 
“economically incomplete.”22 She models formally the signaling 
effects of bargaining proposals and demonstrates that uninformed 
parties may infer information from the content of a proposal made by 
more informed parties. A fear of adverse inferences may lead the 
more informed parties to forego proposing potentially surplus-
enhancing terms when they negotiate their contracts.23 
 Illustrating her model, Spier uses a stylized example of a 
professional athlete negotiating his employment contract with a 
sports team.24 Even though the athlete might want an “injury 
clause,” that is, a specific provision guaranteeing some minimum 
level of compensation in the event of an injury, and even though he 
presumably would accept the commensurate downward wage 
adjustment that is actuarially appropriate for a wage guarantee 
(since he is more risk-averse than the team), he is nevertheless 
unlikely to propose such a provision in negotiations. This is because, 
predicts Spier, the athlete recognizes that the team may view his 
very request to include an injury clause as a signal that he has a 
greater than average tendency to become injured. If the team does 
read the proposal as such a signal, then it will adjust his wage by 
more than the average cost of an injury. Not knowing how injury-
prone the athlete truly is due to the costly observability of this 
characteristic, but knowing that it is likely known (or at least more 
known) by the athlete as private information, the team would 
conclude that, other things being equal, it is the more fragile athletes 
who tend to benefit from injury clauses. Hence it would suspect that 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Bernstein speculates that these forces may arise in certain short-term 
transactions as well. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 71 (“Similar barriers to contracting 
around default rules are also present even in transactional settings where the parties do 
not have long-term business or social relationships and tend to think about the transaction 
in terms of their legal rights and duties.”). 
 22. Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992). 
 23. Id. at 433. 
 24. See id. 
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those who ask for such clauses are more likely to be fragile, and it 
would draw an adverse inference from any such request. Regardless 
of the true probability of injury, and regardless of the presumably 
superior knowledge the athlete might have both of that probability 
and of his personal preference to forgo some wages to gain the 
insurance term, surplus-enhancing injury clauses might never get 
put on the negotiating table by athletes for fear of the negative 
message they could send.25 
 A similar understanding of the strategic behavior of negotiating 
parties is developed in an important article by Jason Johnston.26 
Critiquing the idea that default rules should be designed to induce 
the revelation of information (the “penalty default” paradigm),27 
Johnston notes that strategic considerations in certain circumstances 
could make it undesirable for parties to propose deviations from 
background legal rules.28 He argues that it could conceivably be a 
superior strategy for a party to remain silent and accept a seemingly 
inefficient default arrangement, rather than propose a potentially 
efficient opt-out, if the very process of opting out effectively requires 
the revelation of valuable private information that can be exploited 
by the other party. For example, a shipper who highly values safe 
carriage of goods might be inclined to contract out of default rules of 
limited carrier liability and ask for higher liability coverage. But in 
so proposing such a high-insurance opt-out, she would reveal to the 
carrier her higher value attached to full performance of the contract 
and thus expose herself to having a greater share of her surplus 
extracted by the carrier through a price adjustment that would more 
than account for the greater liability.29 Facing this expropriation risk, 
the shipper might prefer to remain silent and accept the suboptimal 
                                                                                                                      
 25. See id. Interestingly, injury clauses are apparently the norm in some professional 
sports’ collective bargaining agreements (hockey) but not others (football). See Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Between the NHL and the NHL Players’ Ass’n, art. 23.4 (June 26, 
1997), http://www.nhlpa.com/CBA/PDF/CBA-1997.pdf [hereinafter NHL CBA]; Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players Ass’n, art. 
XII, § 2 (Feb. 25, 1998), http://www.nflpa.org/Media/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art12 
[hereinafter NFL CBA]. The reader is invited to speculate why these different norms might 
have developed, which may have to do with the comparative prevalence and seriousness of 
injuries. It is possible that NFL players have a greater chance of experiencing major 
injuries than NHL players, and this increased risk led to differences in standard contract 
norms. In any event, the injury clause norms are mandatory rather than waiveable by 
contract, so not amenable to empirical analysis of opting out behavior.  
 26. See Johnston, supra note 3. 
 27. See id. at 616; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing 
the concept of “penalty defaults”).  
 28. Johnston, supra note 3, passim. 
 29. Id. at 617. 
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liability coverage; the default arrangement will stick.30 Johnston uses 
this example to conclude that strategic behavior in forming contracts 
can be influenced by the content of the default rules. In other words, 
not only are default rules sticky, but some defaults are stickier than 
others.31 Under Johnston’s argument, the limited liability default is 
stickier than an unlimited liability default because only with the 
former does an opt-out reveal the shipper’s high idiosyncratic value 
of performance.32 
 Johnston’s argument was responded to by Ian Ayres and Robert 
Gertner, the original proponents of penalty defaults, who concede that 
strategic considerations could affect party conduct in moving out of 
default positions but disagree with the implication that these 
incentives could be asymmetric.33 Proposing an “irrelevance 
conjecture,” Ayres and Gertner contend that any signal an informed 
party could choose to withhold in negotiating a contract could be 
effectively extracted through a screening proposal by the counterparty 
to force selection from a fixed menu of terms.34 Therefore, they 
conclude, rather than the content of a default rule making some gaps 
more inefficient than others due to asymmetric signaling, “those 
inefficiencies will be the same regardless of the initial gap filler.”35 
Johnston and Ayres & Gertner all agree, however, that strategic 
incentives influence contracting behavior in just the same way as 
direct transaction costs; all can undermine efficient tailoring.36 
 Yet another strand of contracts scholarship identifies the 
stickiness of default terms and suggests that externalities might be a 
cause. In a series of articles, Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan 
discuss the network externalities of standard contract provisions that 
include “learning” and “networking” benefits.37 Learning benefits are 
the advantages that retrospective usage of an entrenched legal term 
(through judicial interpretation, legal service familiarity, and so 
forth) accord current users.38 These benefits arise wholly apart from 
the rule’s intrinsic efficiency. Network benefits are the collective 
advantages shared among multiple contemporaneous (and 
                                                                                                                      
 30. Ayres and Gertner recognized this obstacle to information-forcing opt-outs. See 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of 
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 741 (1992) (noting the possibility that contractual 
inefficiencies will persist even when contracting is costless and showing that these 
inefficiencies arise when the hidden characteristics of the more informed party are 
nonverifiable). 
 31. See Johnston, supra note 3, at 626-27. 
 32. See id. at 630-31. 
 33. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 30, at 732-34. 
 34. See id. at 737-39. 
 35. Id. at 737. 
 36. See id.; see also Johnston, supra note 3. 
 37. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 718-27; Klausner, supra note 4, at 772-825. 
 38. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 718. 
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prospective) users of a term when it is widely proliferated.39 The 
quintessential example of such a networking benefit is telephone 
technology; a solitary telephone is of limited usefulness, but when 
everyone has one they become quite valuable.40 Similarly, a legal 
term, dispersed throughout a network, can create externalities—
benefits that may be unrelated to the inherent value of the term 
itself (recall that Betamax was supposedly a superior product but 
everyone used VHS).41 Kahan and Klausner model under which 
conditions these learning and network externalities can distort the 
selection of legal rules and lead to suboptimal terms.42 Such 
situations provide yet another illustration of when defaults can 
become sticky.43 
 Although these prior analyses offer differing perspectives regarding 
the stickiness of default rules, they all examine the same phenomenon. 
They each struggle to understand the true and full costs of deviating 
from the status quo that parties incur in forming their contracts, 
beyond the simple transaction costs of drafting. In the next section, 
this Article builds (modestly) upon a subset of these accounts—the 
Johnston-Spier-Bernstein signaling theory—to suggest that the scope 
of this stickiness problem is potentially broader and more prevalent 
than previously perceived.44 
III.   THE COSTS OF DEVIATING FROM DEFAULT RULES: FEAR OF THE 
UNKNOWN? 
 In situations of contract formation by two arms-length parties, 
each actor forms opinions and expectations about the other party and 
the value she brings to the transaction through the filters of 
incomplete and asymmetric information. Anytime a relationship 
involves uncertainty about attributes of the partner, the process of 
entering into a contract is affected, and potentially obstructed, by 
information the parties infer about one another.  
                                                                                                                      
 39. See id. at 725-27. 
 40. See Klausner, supra note 4, at 772. 
 41. A typical example of these benefits is in insurance industry boilerplate, where 
wide proliferation of identical language allows insurance carriers to compare actuarial 
data. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006). 
 42. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 730. 
 43. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 947 (2004). 
 44. This survey is not comprehensive. For example, Mark Roe has written about 
“semi-strong path dependence” and defaults. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law 
and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 648-52 (1996). And Claire Hill, for example, 
explored literature about the incentive of attorneys to draft contracts that resemble 
familiar and existing templates. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in 
“Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (2001) (suggesting that nervous junior associates 
might prefer leaving boilerplate unaltered because “the form offers comfort”). 
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 Information can be gathered about partners in a variety of 
manners. The very terms of a proposed deal provide one such 
important source of information. These terms have an effect beyond 
their direct content value (that is, their direct worth to a fully 
informed recipient of the proposal). They additionally serve as 
potential indicators regarding unknown attributes of the proposing 
party. The athlete from Spier’s example45 solicits an injury clause 
(that guarantees some salary in the event of an injury) because, 
presumably, he would prefer compensation adjustment to self-
insurance. The content of this term, that is, its full-information 
value, is negative for the recipient: it should compel an actuarial 
downward wage adjustment by the employer to compensate for the 
expected value of the insurance risk. But the proposed term has 
another negative effect, as Spier explains, which emerges only when 
the recipient is imperfectly informed. This is the negative signal 
regarding the athlete’s privately known internal attributes and the 
related likelihood that he will become injured.  
 To see the full potential effect of the proposal to deviate from the 
default, consider the athlete example, but this time imagine a mirror 
version of Spier’s hypothetical. Spier’s signaling account suggests 
that while parties worry about terms that can generate negative 
signals (such as requesting an injury clause when the default is for 
exclusion of injury compensation), they should be more than willing 
to opt out when the inferred information is positive. In Spier’s 
example, because the default norm is for no injury insurance, an 
athlete would be disinclined to propose a deviation from this default, 
even if it were efficient, for fear of sending the adverse signal 
regarding his fragility. But what about the reverse scenario, in which 
the default arrangement or the norm is for the routine inclusion of 
injury clauses? In such a circumstance, Spier’s signaling account 
suggests that some athletes should be eager to send the reverse 
signal. They would offer to waive the default injury clause so as to 
signal positively to the prospective employer their unobservable 
private attributes (that is, that they are especially hale), and they 
should accordingly demand a higher wage, augmented at least by the 
actuarial risk foregone by the employer relieved of such insurance 
liability. Therefore, opting out of the default should be likely to occur 
when the opt-out, as in this example, has positive direct content 
value and is consistent with a positive signal. 
 The policy prescription that follows from this signaling reasoning 
is to set default rules where positive signals, or at least no negative 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Spier, supra note 22, at 433. 
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signals, will result as natural inferences from opting out.46 Indeed, 
building upon the asymmetric information-forcing effects of 
competing default rules, Johnston claims that the Hadley v. 
Baxendale default rule of limited carrier liability stifles opt-out by 
shippers who fear the negative strategic consequences of seeking 
higher liability coverage. But a reversal of the Hadley v. Baxendale 
default rule—to a legal baseline of unlimited carrier liability—would 
create an environment conducive to opt-outs, freeing shippers from 
some of the strategic motives that would otherwise impair them from 
private tailoring under the current rule.47  
 There is an additional factor, however, that renders more difficult 
the task of setting default rules such that opt-out proposals will be 
immune from negative signals. If, say, one default rule (“no injury 
insurance”) generates a negative inference against parties who 
propose to opt out of it, it does not follow that the opposite default 
rule (“injury insurance”) will guarantee a positive inference. True, it 
is possible that parties might interpret waiver of a default injury 
clause positively (the athlete is injury-free), as Spier’s analysis 
suggests.48 Indeed, the direct content value of the term should force, 
other things being equal, an upward wage adjustment to compensate 
for the employer’s reduced risk of not having to provide disability 
insurance. But other things are not equal. A departure from the 
“norm”—a proposal to incorporate terms that are not the standard, 
default terms—may in and of itself raise suspicion. A negative 
account can also be constructed for the proposed deviation, 
notwithstanding its positive direct content value. Here, it could be 
that the deviation of waiving an injury clause would cause the 
employer to question the athlete’s commitment to the enterprise. (“Is 
he not going to be giving his all in each match? Is that why he thinks 
he will never be injured?”) It might even signal more generally to the 
employer that the athlete is prone to hyper-negotiate his contract 
and perhaps be the type of person who will hold out in future phases 
of the relationship to expropriate a disproportionate share of any 
surplus. As Bernstein notes, a proposal to tinker with the boilerplate 
terms may signal legalistic attributes and even litigiousness.49 The 
                                                                                                                      
 46. Ayres and Gertner argue that when the uninformed party can propose a “menu” of 
contracts, the content of the default rule becomes irrelevant. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 30, 
at 739-41. Under their framework, the problem of negative signals is muted since it is up to 
the uninformed party to “screen” the information in a manner that does not leave the 
informed parties the option of remaining silent and hiding their information. Id. at 739 n.33.  
 47. See Johnston, supra note 3, at 630. Presumably the current rule makes opt-out by 
carriers easier because their offering unlimited liability could signal reliability. Indeed, 
although a shipper likely has superior ex ante knowledge about the damages from breach 
of the shipping contract, the carrier has superior knowledge about the likelihood of breach. 
 48. Spier, supra note 22, at 433. 
 49. Bernstein, supra note 18, at 71-72. 
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deviation is thus susceptible to more than one explanatory account, 
and one or more of those accounts may well be negative. 
 That the deviant term can be reconciled with more than one 
rationale does not mean that a negative version will necessarily 
eclipse a positive one. The claim here is more modest: the presence of 
a plausible positive explanation for a deviant term that should be 
costed favorably on its direct content value by a rational actor does 
not preclude the simultaneous existence of an alternative, less 
positive account. This possibility of multifaceted interpretation 
means that any recipient of a proposal can recast a term that is 
facially favorable into one that carries, regardless of its objectively 
positive content, an accompanying negative message about 
unobserved characteristics of the proposer. 
 When a negative inference is plausible, it will provide a basis for a 
negatively disposed recipient to rationalize the deviance adversely. 
The degree of plausibility is, of course, relevant, because the more 
intuitive the negative explanation, the stronger the negative 
inference.50 In strong enough cases, the negative message could 
conceivably outweigh the otherwise favorable value of a positive-cost 
term to the recipient. For example, if the concern of the athlete’s non-
commitment to the enterprise (even if never validly grounded) 
overshadows the actuarial benefit to the recipient team that should 
follow from waiving an injury clause, then the default injury clause 
might stick, even when inefficient. Indeed, in settings in which 
deviations are uncommon, it will become increasingly likely that the 
recipient will be disposed to construct or select a negative account, 
and hence default rules will be at their stickiest. 
 The inherent suspicion toward proposals to opt out may stem, as 
Bernstein suggests, from the adverse messages about the deviating 
party’s treatment of relational norms—that she will be unlikely to 
resolve disputes in a collaborative and informal manner.51 Indeed, as 
Alan Schwartz posits, it might cue that the proposer is hyper-
litigious.52 It might even be a negative signal in the traditional 
                                                                                                                      
 50. This may be related to the theory of “counterfactual reasoning,” where negative 
events possibly cause subjects to relive those events counterfactually, altering the most 
“mutable” characteristics, in feeling regret. Even positive events can trigger some 
counterfactual thinking when negative events are “very close to occurring.” Korobkin, 
supra note 12; see also text accompanying notes 93-108 (summarizing social psychological 
literature). Thus, the more plausible a negative account is, the more likely a deviant term 
is to trouble a recipient.  
 51. Bernstein, supra note 18, at 70-71. 
 52. Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An 
Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 397 (1990); see also 
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1581, 1586 (2005) (noting sellers would avoid consumers who attempted to negotiate 
changes to a form contract due to fear of litigiousness). 
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economic sense used by Spier: a visible proxy for a specifically 
identified but unobservable attribute.53 Any of these explanations, of 
course, may overlap with a black box cognitive bias of preferring the 
status quo, as explored by Korobkin,54 or with a reluctance to forfeit 
accrued network benefits from using standardized terms, as 
discussed by Kahan and Klausner.55 But it could also be something 
broader and more diffuse than any of these fairly particularized 
grounds. It might be that parties’ disinclinations toward deviance 
stem from a rudimentary fear of the unknown. 
 Pause to reflect on the commercial contracting setting. When a 
party does not know her counterpart well, she must always consider 
the risk of being exploited by an undesirable or opportunistic actor. 
There is consequently added comfort when that counterpart plays 
the game according to familiar patterns. Conversely, there is added 
concern when the counterpart’s conduct is unfamiliar, different from 
what is ordinarily done. The asymmetric information regarding the 
counterpart’s attributes makes parties seek out clues to ascertain 
these hidden traits, which are theoretically infinite in number, to 
reduce the information disparity and minimize uncertainty.56 
 It is possible that these clues the parties seek out are both broader 
and looser than what economists traditionally refer to as “signals.” In 
a strict signaling account, the party who is less informed uses an 
observation about the informed party’s conduct to make a rational 
inference of the counterpart’s unobserved type. The recipient of a 
proposal first identifies the unknown trait and then predicts that a 
person of a given type will be more likely to make the proposal that 
the counterpart made; the proposal is a signal for the unknown 
trait.57 In military parlance, the signal serves as a proxy for a 
“known” unknown: a situation in which the uninformed party knows 
the domain (the “distribution”) of her ignorance.58 
 In the contracting setting, however, it is additionally possible that 
the uninformed party does not even know what it is that she doesn’t 
know; that is, the uninformed party may not be proactively seeking out 
a signal to serve as a proxy for a specified but unobservable 
characteristic. Rather, she may reactively regard a deviation from the 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Spier, supra note 22, at 434.  
 54. See Korobkin, supra note 8, at 625-30. 
 55. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7. 
 56. Cf. Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why 
Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 109-10 (2000) (predicting that transactors are 
less suspicious of form contracts than highly tailored ones due to fears of the exploitation of 
private information more possible in highly tailored ones).  
 57. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-20 (2000). 
 58. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld popularized the term “unknown 
unknown” in 2002. See Press Conference, DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and 
Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002.  
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default as raising a red flag. It cues her to wake up and become 
concerned, even without a lucid understanding of what the relevant 
unknown characteristic worthy of concern is. She experiences fear of 
the “unknown unknown.”59 Such a deviant proposal causes her to 
think, “I don’t know what it is that I should know better about my 
counterpart, but something doesn’t look right.” This fear of the 
unknown may account for documented situations of contractual 
parties becoming “spooked” by unconventional terms. For example, in 
a study on Silicon Valley start-up ventures, Joseph Bankman found a 
dearth of (tax-efficient) partnership structures and a plethora of (tax-
inefficient) stand-alone corporation structures.60 In offering an account 
based on the ability of corporations to confer compensation through 
the readily familiar tool of “stock options” (as opposed to partnerships’ 
less gainly tool of “partnership interests”), a surveyed venture 
capitalist observed, “Management gets spooked by [the unfamiliar tool 
of] partnership interests.”61 This led Bankman in turn to conclude, “in 
an atmosphere of trust, it might take only a few hours to explain the 
equivalence of corporate and partnership options or interests. In an 
atmosphere of distrust, an employee might feel reluctant to accept any 
explanation, however coherent.”62 Thus a prospective employee offered 
partnership interests instead of stock options, even if told the reason 
for doing so is tax-related, might nevertheless “get spooked” that such 
exotica portend something wrong.63 
 The psychological underpinning for this suspicious tendency may 
find its roots in the phenomenon known as “ambiguity aversion,” or 
more formally, “source preference,” in the social psychology 
literature.64 One strand of this research explores the degree to which 
decisionmakers generally prefer “known” to “unknown” risks.65 As 
broad generalization, when presented with a choice between flipping 
a coin and having it land heads (p = 0.5) and drawing a red chip from 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See id. 
 60. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1737, 1738 (1994). 
 61. Id. at 1751. 
 62. Id. at 1752; see also Klausner, supra note 4, at 821 (postulating that Bankman’s 
findings could  be a manifestation of marketing externalities). 
 63. Another illustration of this might be in the diametric default rules concerning the 
right to sue under the automobile insurance schemes in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
Default coverage seems to predominate in both jurisdictions. See Kahneman et al., supra 
note 13, at 199. 
 64. See Craig R. Fox & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, 
and Decision Context, 88 ORGL. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 476, 478 (2002). 
 65. See, e.g., Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative 
Ignorance, 110 Q. J. ECON. 585 (1995); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Variants of 
Uncertainty, 11 COGNITION 143 (1982); J. Frank Yates & Lisa G. Zukowski, 
Characterization of Ambiguity in Decision Making, 21 BEHAV. SCI. 19 (1976). Note that 
Korobkin suggests that his “inertia theory” may, in fact, be predicated upon these 
psychological trends. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1622-24. 
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an urn with ten chips of which between three and seven are red (p = 
0.5), subjects tend to prefer the known risk of the coin toss, 
notwithstanding the equal probability of the chip draw, because it is 
of equal risk but it is less “ambiguous.”66 In other words, the source of 
its probability is more known. Secondary studies in this area explore 
various refinements, including, among other factors, the ability to 
mute the effect in noncomparative forced-choice environments,67 the 
sensitivity of the effect to the probability level of the underlying 
risk,68 and the framing effects of juxtaposing confidence-building and 
conference-shaking heuristics.69 
 One of the dominant models explaining this behavior relies upon 
the concept of “comparative ignorance,” whereby decisionmakers tend 
to feel more anxious in situations where their adversaries (or even 
experimenters) are perceived to have more knowledge or competence 
in assessing the underlying risk probability.70 In a particularly 
relevant study, the data suggest that subjects seek to avoid, with 
increasing anxiety, situations in which the risk probability is known, 
situations in which the risk probability is unknown and unknowable 
by any party, and situations in which the risk is unknown but more 
likely to be known by another party (that is, escalating comparative 
ignorance).71 Considering these psychological findings, it could well be 
that the proposal of an aberrational term unsettles the recipient, who 
starts to focus on his comparative ignorance of the other party’s 
internal attributes. (“Why did she propose that? Normal people don’t 
put in that term. What is it about this person that I don’t know? What 
is it about this deal that she knows but I don’t?”) The more jarring 
(cognitively dissonant) the departure is from standard terms, the more 
salient the trigger will be that invokes comparative ignorance 
concerns. This is why the mere existence of a plausible negative 
account to the deviance is more important than its ultimate 
persuasiveness vis-à-vis a positive account; the existence of a negative 
possible explanation fuels the fear of the unknown and sets the 
recipient down a speculative path of worry regarding his counterpart’s 
private information.72 While of course we do not seek to construct a 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See Yates & Zukowski, supra note 65, at 20. 
 67. See Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates, The Center and Range of the Probability 
Interval as Factors Affecting Ambiguity Preferences, 36 ORGL. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 273 (1985). 
 68. See Fox & Weber, supra note 64. 
 69. See Bryan K. Church & Ping Zhang, Bargaining Behavior and Payoff Uncertainty: 
Experimental Evidence, 20 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 407 (1999).  
 70. See Fox & Tversky, supra note 65, at 587-88.  
 71. See Clare Chua Chow & Rakesh K. Sarin, Known, Unknown, and Unknowable 
Uncertainties, 52 THEORY & DECISION 127 (2002).  
 72. It is for this reason that if, by corollary, a deviation from the status quo can be 
accompanied by a credible explanation, the proposer may defuse or at least minimize the 
negative potential signal. 
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formal psychological model within the scope of this Article, we do offer 
this account as a further possible explanation for the ubiquity and 
persistence of default stickiness and the seeming avoidance of 
deviance in writing contracts. 
 Importantly, this negative disposition toward deviant terms is not 
unique to default legal rules. A similar stickiness potentially exists 
when the default arrangement is embodied in a business norm (for 
example, cash on delivery) or in routine provisions of industry 
boilerplate (for example, closing terms of standard-form residential 
purchase and sale agreements).73 Indeed, notwithstanding the 
presence of a default legal rule, a norm may emerge under which 
transactors regularly opt out of the legal rule and create a stock 
commercial term that is the opposite. In such situations, the 
background norm, rather than the legal rule, would arguably become 
the relevant “default.”74 For example, a default rule in shipping 
contracts of consequential damages in the event of breach (the 
Hadley rule) can be and often is readily reversed by a boilerplate 
disclaimer of liability and nominal cap on damages.75 In such 
situations, the stickiness likely applies with respect to the boilerplate 
term, not the common law backdrop against which it was developed. 
Thus the problem of stickiness may be even broader than a formal 
conception of “legal” defaults might suggest. 
 This understanding of stickiness also suggests that the 
frequency—and infrequency—of opting out will have a self-
reinforcing quality. The less often opt-out happens, the more 
empirically prevalent the background default becomes. The greater 
empirical prevalence of the background rule will in turn increase the 
suspicious nature of any specific instance of deviation, which further 
in turn will weaken the incentive of any party to propose such a 
deviation in the first place. Conversely, the more common it becomes 
to propose opting out of a particular term, the less reason there will 
be for the recipient of the proposal to be suspicious, and so the norm 
                                                                                                                      
 73. In these situations, where the parties’ familiarity with the background 
arrangement is acquired through experience, the negative inferences attributed to 
deviance may be more severe. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 70-71. But cf. Korobkin, 
supra note 12, at 1603-05. 
 74. One of Korobkin’s experiments produced data that may be at odds with this 
intuition, suggesting that parties’ status quo preference might be stronger to the 
underlying legal default rule rather than the opposite commercial norm. See Korobkin, 
supra note 12, at 1603-05. For reasons beyond the scope of this Article, methodological 
constraints in Korobkin’s law student experiment may limit the generalizability of his 
findings, and these ones especially. For a more detailed critique of Korobkin’s methodology, 
see Guy Rub, The Grounds for the Stickiness of Contractual Default Rules 34-43 (Aug. 
2004) (unpublished thesis) (on file with author). 
 75. Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of 
Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 120-21 (1989) (noting the norm of limiting damages for 
loss and delay in shipping contract forms). 
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against private tailoring should weaken. In these latter situations, 
not only will parties be less inclined to penalize the proposed opt-out 
under consideration, but they also will be more amenable to having 
discussions about the content of the underlying term itself. It will get 
placed “on the table.” In other words, an equilibrium in which few if 
any opt-outs occur is possible, but it is by no means unique. If some 
parties “fluctuate,” by experimenting with deviant provisions, then 
instances of deviation will become less rare and the suspicion against 
them will subside.76 There may even be a critical mass threshold 
depending on the term and the parties. 
 In this regard, one of the interesting results from Korobkin’s 
status quo bias experiments are the data that he does not analyze. 
Korobkin’s principal experimental design involves a hypothetical 
bargaining over the terms of a delivery contract. In the relevant 
baseline trial (Trial 1), he analyzes an impossibility excuse, that is, a 
contractual term that releases the delivery service from liability for 
breach if external circumstances make fulfillment of the contract 
impossible.77 To test the presence of a status quo bias, Korobkin 
assigns subjects to two conditions. In the first condition, subjects are 
told that the default legal rule is for such an impossibility excuse and 
asked how much the delivery service should demand to waive the 
legal rule.78 In the second condition, subjects are told that there is no 
impossibility excuse in default law and asked how much the delivery 
service would pay to secure it.79 Strictly Coasian economic actors 
should price the term the same way (to waive it if they have it by 
default or to buy it if they do not), but Korobkin finds a status quo 
bias based on the different mean prices between the two conditions 
($188,000 in the first to waive and $56,000 in the second to buy, with 
a p < 0.01).80 
 To explore further an “inertia theory” explanation, Korobkin 
conducts Trial 2, in which he alters the experiments, telling subjects 
in the first condition that while the default rule is for an 
impossibility excuse, that rule is actually a new legal development 
and that previously there was no such excuse (he does so to test the 
effect of learning benefit externalities).81 In the second condition, he 
reverses, with no impossibility excuse again being the default, but a 
newly created one.82 He still finds “inertia” in the differing mean 
                                                                                                                      
 76. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1605-08 (giving an example of a rapid shift from a 
no-opt-out equilibrium to a common-opt-out equilibrium). 
 77. Id. at 1590-92. 
 78. Id. at 1591. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1591-92. 
 81. Id. at 1599-1600. 
 82. Id. at 1600. 
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prices for waiving/buying the term ($139,000 versus $31,000, with a 
p < 0.001).83 Moreover, in Trial 3 (to test the preference of legal rules 
versus commercial norms), he makes the first condition that the 
default legal rule is for an impossibility excuse but that there is a 
routine commercial practice of waiving the rule, and the second 
condition the reverse.84 Yet again, a “status quo bias” trend persists 
in the mean prices ($63,000 versus $20,000, with a p < 0.05).85 
 Korobkin’s interesting studies focus on within trial differences 
between conditions. What are more interesting for the present 
analysis are the among trial differences across conditions. While we 
do not have the data to analyze the variance, the falling price offers 
of the first condition from Trial 1 to Trial 2 to Trial 3 ($188,000 to 
$139,000 to $63,000) support the intuitions of this Article, namely, 
that a norm that is less entrenched becomes more susceptible to 
deviation and hence permits parties to exact less of a penalty for 
alteration. In Trial 1, subjects were told of a default legal rule and 
asked to deviate from it by waiver; they demanded a high price.86 In 
Trial 2, they were told of a default legal rule, but that that rule was a 
newly created one; they demanded less.87 In Trial 3, they were told 
that the default “rule” was in name only and was systematically 
departed from; they demanded still less.88 The default rule thus 
became less sticky in strength as its “pedigree” diminished.89 
 In conclusion, if default rules are indeed stickier than previous 
accounts suggest (as we believe), then there may be ramifications for 
legal policymaking. For example, policymakers should arguably place 
even more emphasis on setting accurate defaults, because departure 
costs might be higher than previously thought. As for the effect on 
penalty default rules, however, there are more complex 
considerations. On the one hand, the premise that parties will easily 
opt out of them to avoid the penalty may be more difficult to defend 
when there is widespread stickiness that stifles tailoring. On the 
other hand, harsh enough penalty defaults can overcome the 
stickiness effect, and once that effect is overcome, the increased 
prevalence of deviation will, in and of itself, attenuate the stickiness 
of the default rule even further.90 
                                                                                                                      
 83. Id. at 1601-02. 
 84. Id. at 1603-04. 
 85. Id. at 1604-05. 
 86. Id. at 1591. 
 87. Id. at 1599-1600. 
 88. Id. at 1603-04. 
  89. Similarly, in the second condition, the price fell from Trial 1 to Trial 2 to Trial 3 
by $56,000 to $31,000 to $20,000.  See id. at 1605 tbl.2.C. 
 90. Professor Klausner notes that legal “menus” of multiple options from which one 
must be affirmatively selected can help overcome the power of “focal points” upon which 
parties can fixate and become stuck. Klausner, supra note 4, at 800-01. 
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 Another policy implication of the stickiness conjecture has to do 
with the design of standard forms. Many de facto default provisions 
appear not in the Uniform Commercial Code or in industry 
regulations but rather in boilerplate forms that are distributed by 
trade groups and nonprofits to industry participants, often with no 
charge.91 Once these circulated forms achieve enough popularity, 
they may themselves become “sticky”; that is, it may be difficult to 
adopt competing forms with different terms. This suggests that the 
drafters of popular forms have more power than is perceived. They 
can implement terms that are one-sided without leaving adversely 
affected parties a realistic opportunity to opt out. Associations that 
coordinate these forms may therefore create antitrust concerns even 
if there are no apparent transaction costs to opting out of their forms. 
Thus, the stickiness problem raises issues regarding the influence of 
the organizations that draft standard forms. It may justify closer 
social scrutiny of the terms they promulgate.92 
IV.   EXAMPLES 
 This Part identifies instances in which a default rule varies, 
either across jurisdictions or over time. It argues that the absence of 
noted differences in the degree of opt-out under these varying 
circumstances provides evidence of stickiness. 
A.   Revocability of Offers  
 Before her offer has been accepted, an offeror may suffer a change 
of heart. Market prices could change, she could receive better 
proposals to deal, or she might discover something about the offeree. 
Various reasons could underlie her desire to revoke. Under the 
traditional common law, offers were historically revocable anytime 
prior to acceptance.93 In fact, this rule was not even a default provision 
from which the offeror could opt out: it was impossible to make 
irrevocable offers by mere statement of intent. Under classic contract 
law, a statement by the offeror that an offer was irrevocable for a 
given length of time—the so-called firm offer—lacked legal effect.94 
                                                                                                                      
 91. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2006). 
 92. This concern is separate from the political economy concerns of how these forms 
are produced. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private 
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995). 
 93. Dickinson v. Dodds, (1876) 2 Ch.D. 463, 472 (Ch.).  
 94. See, e.g., Routledge v. Grant, (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 920 (Bing.) (stating that a 
promise to keep an offer open for a fixed period is not binding absent consideration by the 
offeree). By corollary, a promise not to revoke supported by independent consideration was 
enforceable as forming an independent contract unto itself. 
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 Modern common law gradually eroded the immutable revocability 
rule. Likely recognizing that it may be in the interest of offerors to 
issue irrevocable offers (and that it is surely in the interest of 
offerees to receive irrevocable offers), the law came to permit offerors 
to stipulate an offer’s irrevocability. Dispensing with the requirement 
of independent consideration, the law’s reasoning shifted to focus on 
reliance by the offeree, not economic consideration of the deal, to 
justify allowing the promise not-to-revoke to become binding.95 
Codifying this understanding, section 2-205 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code enables merchants to make offers irrevocable for 
up to three months.96 Thus, under Anglo-American law, revocability 
is now a default rule, subject to virtually costless alteration. Offers 
are revocable anytime prior to acceptance, but an offeror may opt out 
of this default simply by stating that the offer is firm. 
 Other legal systems, however, have different revocability defaults. 
In Germany, for example, the default rule is opposite from the Anglo-
American one (as it is in Switzerland, Portugal, and Brazil, to name 
a few other places).97 Unless otherwise stated explicitly, offers are 
irrevocable during the time in which the offeror may expect an 
answer under ordinary circumstances, or for such other time as 
specified in the offer.98 Again, this is only a default—opting out is 
possible. Indeed, it is very simple. All an offeror needs to do to 
recapture the power of revocation is add sufficiently clear language, 
such as, “this offer is revocable at any time prior to its acceptance.” 
Under the German practice, the use of terms like freibleibend 
(“without engagement”) or widerruflich (“revocable”) would suffice to 
reverse the irrevocability default and make the offer fully revocable.99  
                                                                                                                      
 95. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760-61 (Cal. 1958); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of 
Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 280-91. 
 96. U.C.C. section 2-205 states the following:  
  An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its 
terms give assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of 
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable 
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months . . . .  
U.C.C. § 2-205 (2005); see also United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), art. 16(2), Apr. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 
(1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 97. See generally Franco Ferrari, A Comparative Overview of Offer and Acceptance 
Inter Absentes, 10 B.U. INT’L L.J. 171, 188-91 (1992) (describing various legal systems’ 
solutions to revocability of offers); CASEBOOKS ON THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE: 
CONTRACT LAW 200-06 (Hugh Beale et al. eds., 2002) (same). 
 98. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] §§ 145, 147(2), 148, translated in THE 
GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Simon L. Goren trans., 1994); see also NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH 
SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 384 (3d ed. 2002). 
 99. FOSTER & SULE, supra note 98, at 384; see also P.D.V. MARSH, COMPARATIVE 
CONTRACT LAW: ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 63 (1994); BGB § 145 (“Whoever offers to 
another to enter a contract is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded being so bound.”). 
672  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:651 
 
 Since it is impossible that both the Anglo-American revocability 
rule and the German irrevocability rule are equally efficient (indeed, 
they are diametrical), we should expect that opt-out will occur in one 
of these jurisdictions more prevalently than the other. In fact, given 
the polar nature of this rule (either revocable or not), we would 
expect opting out to be commonplace in one of the countries, readily 
detectible to the outside observer. This is especially so because the 
direct costs of opting out—either adding a freibleibend recital in 
Germany or signing on the firmness of the offer in the United 
States—are practically zero.100 And yet, surprisingly, such prevalent 
opt-out does not appear.101 In Germany, other than in discrete past 
periods of severe economic trouble and hyperinflation during which 
the freibleibend exception became for a time (unsurprisingly) widely 
used, it has been uncommon for offerors to opt out of the 
irrevocability default.102 German commentators do not find this result 
surprising. They describe their practice of keeping offers irrevocable 
as a “superior system.”103 As leading German comparativists note in 
so concluding, “[E]xperience shows that [the irrevocability] results 
are practical and equitable; the offeree can act with assurance in the 
knowledge that his acceptance will bring about a contract.”104 
 Similarly, there is no detectably robust pattern of opt-out under 
the Anglo-American revocability default. In general, offers are made 
in a revocable, nonbinding fashion. Some limited empirical 
scholarship explores this trend. One such study examines opt-out 
practice within the construction industry. It finds that tendering 
subcontractors do not opt into an irrevocability regime when making 
their bids. Nor do general contractors request those bids to be 
                                                                                                                      
 100. Benefits from defining the revocability term surely exist. Indeed, offer 
irrevocability is one major type of precontractual liability. There is now a burgeoning body 
of literature on the value of precontractual liability, both in terms of distribution effects 
and in terms of efficiency. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, 
Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001); Richard Craswell, Offer, 
Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should 
an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 
YALE L.J. 1249 (1996). 
 101. Proving that a specific practice does not exist is, of course, a difficult task. We 
neither offer such proof nor intend to suggest that the opposite conclusion is unprovable. 
We merely report our impression based on numerous informal conversations with 
practitioners and European law professors, as well as a survey of the empirically oriented 
literature. 
 102. See MARSH, supra note 99, at 63. 
 103. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 363 (Tony 
Weir trans., 3d rev. ed., Clarendon Press 1998). 
 104. Id.; see CASEBOOKS ON THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE, supra note 97, at 205. 
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irrevocable.105 Both subs and generals alike seem content with the 
revocability default of their legal system. 
 To be sure, business negotiators often do use firm offers in the 
course of a sales transaction in the United States, such that an offer 
“on the table” may be deemed by section 2-205 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code to be irrevocable. Indeed, one survey of general 
counsels of large firms and conglomerates found that a majority both 
make and receive firm offers regularly in their contracting 
practices.106 The methodology in this study, however, is unfortunate, 
because the respondents were expressly asked to consider as a firm 
offer any “promise to buy or sell at a fixed price over a period of time . 
. . not given in exchange for any promise or other payment by the 
offeree.”107 Thus while such offers might have been technically 
irrevocable in the eyes of the Code, we cannot be certain that the 
respondents actually considered them irrevocable in any 
meaningfully behavior-affecting manner. On the contrary, in other 
parts of the same survey, these respondents indicated that even 
binding promises were often jointly renegotiated.108 So it is not clear 
that we have reliable data indicating an opt-out norm favoring firm 
offers, even within the subset of large firms and conglomerates. 
(Interestingly, even if we did read these data to indicate such a norm, 
we see its prevalence vanish when we move from large conglomerates 
to smaller firms.)109  
 The reluctance of parties to opt out of the revocability default can 
be further evidenced when the default rules change over time within 
a given jurisdiction. Such an example also exists in the specific 
context of bid revocability. In this legal domain, an “interpretive 
shock” occurred when a long-standing default rule of common law 
was reversed regarding reliance upon an outstanding offer.110 The old 
rule, usually illustrated by Judge Learned Hand’s decision in James 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Richard Lewis, Contracts Between Businessmen: Reform of the Law of Firm Offers 
and an Empirical Study of Tendering Practices in the Building Industry, 9 J.L. SOC’Y 153 
(1982). 
 106. Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1, 26-28. 
 107. Id. at 26 (alteration in original). 
 108. See id. at 22-23; see also Note, Another Look at Construction Bidding and 
Contracts at Formation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1720, 1734 (1967) (surveying offerors who 
proclaimed “[o]ur word is our bond and our reputation paramount”). 
 109. Firms that reported using firm offers all had annual income exceeding $500 
million. See Weintraub, supra note 106, at 27-28. Smaller firms did not report using firm 
offers. Id. These results could show that with large firms the stakes of deals are larger and 
more likely to offset any cost of altering defaults. Large firms are also more likely to have 
credible reputations and hence get more mileage from making firm offers because the 
offeree must rely on the offeror not to welch in ascribing value to the offer’s “firmness.” 
 110. This rule is related to, but conceptually distinct from, the revocability of an offer. 
It does not alter the baseline revocability rights of an offeror; rather, it pertains to an 
estoppel based upon (reasonable) counterparty reliance. 
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Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,111 allowed a bidder to revoke its 
(presumptively revocable) bid at any time before acceptance, even 
after the recipient’s pre-acceptance reliance. This rule was effectively 
abolished in 1958 by California Supreme Court Justice Traynor’s 
decision in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.112 What happened to the 
default norm after this interpretive shock? If post-reliance 
revocability were efficient, we should have expected a contracting 
shift back to the old status quo by express stipulations of revocability 
in offers. Otherwise, if it were inefficient, we should have seen 
prevalent opt-in prior to the Drennan decision. But we lack data to 
suggest that anything actually changed after this decision in the way 
parties solicited or submitted bids.113 To be sure, it is risky to draw 
conclusions from this particular area of contracting since many of the 
parties’ motivations are influenced by extralegal norms, reputation 
bonds, and informal accommodations. Nevertheless, this appears to 
be an illustration of the disinclination parties have to opt out of 
defaults, even when those defaults change. 
 Some of the theories discussed earlier in this Article are 
consistent with these observed patterns of opt-out infrequency. For 
example, in some particular contexts the trend can probably be 
explained by the parties’ adherence to informal norms that regulate 
the legitimacy of revocation.114 But this explanation only goes so far. 
When the legal default changes, it usually does not coincide with a 
change in the norms of negotiations. Thus, we would expect opt-out 
and a return to the old revocability default, the one that is consistent 
with the parties’ expectations. It is also hard to imagine what 
network benefits or interpretive advantages could explain this 
default entrenchment. This is why we offer our further account as a 
plausible explanation: deviating from the revocability default under 
either regime may cause the offeree to suspect the value or the 
                                                                                                                      
 111. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). 
 112. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
 113. Two studies from that era demonstrate an almost irrelevance of revocability law in 
the construction industry. See Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of 
Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 259-61 (1952) (finding 
that only half of general contractors even asked for firm offers from their subcontractors 
notwithstanding it being in their obvious interest to do so and that even then many said they 
would allow their subcontractors to back out of bids); Note, supra note 108, at 1733, 1739 
(finding that the U.C.C. firm offer law had little relevance, as most sub bids to general 
contractors were oral, and that bids that were written were not treated differently by the 
generals; finding also that notwithstanding laxity toward firmness of sub offers, a strong 
norm of reliance existed, with ninety-two percent of generals believing that subs should be 
bound after reliance on their bids by the general). Note that the Chicago study found some 
industry-specific trends: manufacturers of basic building materials worried about potential 
firmness of written offers and expressly drafted their bids to preclude firmness. See Schultz, 
supra, at 264. This could be explained by the risk of multiple parallel bids by such offerors 
that could strain capacity if all were accepted. 
 114. See id. 
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integrity of the deal by introducing a fear of the unknown. Against a 
well entrenched backdrop of irrevocability, an offeror who explicitly 
secures for herself the power to retract might be perceived as an 
unreliable “fly-by-night,” one who might even retract from a finalized 
agreement. Her commitment to the transaction could be questioned, 
and with it, the willingness of the offeree to rely upon the offer and 
pursue the deal. By contrast, against a rich backdrop of revocability, 
an offeror who explicitly waives her power to revoke may not 
necessarily enjoy the converse effects of perceived added reliability 
and sense of commitment. Instead, the offeree might still construct 
an unfavorable explanation. He might question whether the offeror 
chose to confer an irrevocable option to him because the offeror had 
no other potential partners knocking on the door. Or he might worry 
that there were other market participants who became aware of 
some problem with the offered deal or with the reputation of the 
offeror. Since there are multiple dimensions of “unknowns,” it is 
plausible that an uninformed offeree could make inferences along one 
of the dimensions that yield a negative signal. Anticipating the 
potential for the opt-out to provoke this negative inference, the 
offeror is more likely to stick to the default practice. 
B.   The Duration of Employment Contracts 
 Another situation that reveals the stickiness of defaults is 
employment contracting, or more specifically, the legal provisions 
that govern the duration of the employment relationship in nonunion 
labor agreements. In almost all jurisdictions in the United States, 
the baseline common law default rule is employment at will,115 that 
is, either party may terminate the relationship at any time, without 
having to display a good cause for the termination act. Parties can of 
course vary this default rule and enter into a more restrictive 
arrangement that limits the set of causes that can give rise to 
unilateral termination. Yet, other than in the union context, in which 
collective bargaining agreements highly formalize the negotiations 
process and subject it to a unique set of rules, such systematic opting 
out does not seem to occur. On the contrary, in a survey-based study 
published in 1995, J. Hoult Verkerke found that only fifteen percent 
of nonunion employers opted out of employment at will by expressly 
according just-cause protection in their employment contracts.116 To 
                                                                                                                      
 115. Employment at will is the default rule in every American jurisdiction except 
Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -902 
(West, Westlaw through 2005 Regular Sess.); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185(a) (2003); V.I. 
CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (West, Westlaw through Acts 6644-6725 of 2004 Reg. and 
Special Sess.); see also MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 300 (2002). 
 116. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment 
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 874-75; see also 2 THE 
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reach this conclusion, Verkerke had to make broad generalizations 
(for example, aggregate employment handbooks and express written 
contracts together), but his data are nonetheless instructive on an 
important American trend. Even more tellingly, one third of his 
respondents used no contracting at all, relying solely upon default 
common law and statutory rules to govern their employment 
relationships.117 
 Within the category of “at-will” arrangements, however, U.S. 
jurisdictions vary along a continuum of employee solicitude. That is, 
although “employment at will remains the default rule for indefinite 
term employment contracts,”118 Verkerke also finds that “[t]he 
strength of the at will presumption varies substantially across 
jurisdictions.”119 The presumption varies across jurisdictions because 
states differ in their judicial opinions interpreting contract doctrines 
such as good faith and implied contracts.120 Effectively, then, the at-
will default rule exhibits some variance across states.  
 Verkerke compares two jurisdictions to see if employers in a more 
“liberal” state, such as California, evince a greater pattern of opting 
out of default common law by contract than employers in a “stricter” 
state, such as Virginia.121 Assuming, for hypothesis only, that the 
liberal rule is more efficient, he offered the following prediction:  
 Employers in California should, therefore, be inclined to 
contract out of the state’s comparatively attractive default rule at 
a lower rate than will Virginia employers. Virginia firms that fail 
to contract receive that state’s stringent, and thus comparatively 
unattractive, at will default. In contrast, California employers will 
get a more relaxed version of the at will presumption that more 
closely approximates the life-cycle just cause default.122   
 Verkerke’s data suggest that the predicted pattern of opting out 
does not occur: there is no statistically significant relationship 
                                                                                                                      
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 48-49 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) 
(discussing the at-will presumption and its erosion). 
 117. Verkerke, supra note 116, at 867. This finding seemed to correlate significantly 
with firm size: the smaller employers relied on default law and avoided contracts 
significantly more than their larger counterparts (almost half of them did not reduce their 
employment relationships to writing). Conceivably this difference in contracting reflects 
the heightened pinch of transaction costs for smaller firms. 
 118. Id. at 863. 
 119. Id. at 848. Most jurisdictions in Verkerke’s estimation have actually settled on 
adopting “an intermediate approach.” Id. 
 120. Id. at 844. 
 121. Id. at 881. More specifically, Verkerke treated “more liberal” as following most 
closely a just-cause animated “life cycle” rule in employment jurisprudence. Id. at 848-50. 
 122. Id. at 881. Verkerke expressly rejected an information-forcing “penalty” default 
analysis in employment contracting. Id. at 885. 
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between state and contractual choice.123 In both jurisdictions, 
employers were sticking with no contracts about one-third of the 
time. In other words, the content of the default rule did not seem to 
goad Virginians to write employment contracts any more than 
Californians.124 The status quo was thus highly sticky, even on a 
matter of such seeming importance in the employment setting as the 
dischargability of employees.125 
 Verkerke’s findings have been subsequently interpreted as an 
illustration of asymmetric signaling, following the Spier/Johnston 
accounts of stickiness. Invoking this explanation for the failure to opt 
out of the default employment rules shown by Verkerke’s data, 
Walter Kamiat contends that “an employee who seeks an enforceable 
just-cause provision in the employment contract confronts a serious 
signalling problem regarding the quality of the employee’s likely 
work.”126 Again, a plausible negative account can be constructed to 
explain the employee’s solicitation of just-cause protection in the 
mind of the employer. (“Was she fired before? Does she predict 
trouble with an at-will relationship?”) Anticipating that such a 
conclusion might be drawn from his findings, however, Verkerke 
dismisses signaling as an explanation in his analysis. He argues that 
any signaling effect of seeking just-cause protection would likely be 
symmetric.127 That is, if the signal of seeking a Pareto-optimal just-
cause dismissal provision conveys negative messages about the 
seeking party’s prospective conduct under the contract (here, the 
employee’s work ethic), then the response to the signal ought to 
convey a similar and offsetting negative signal (here, the employer’s 
stinginess in refusing to allow such an efficient just-cause provision). 
Competitive market forces would permit the disappointed employee 
to seek employment from another employer who offered, or at least 
did not respond hostilely to, such a proposed just-cause term. Thus, 
any negative signal from an employee seeking just cause would be 
                                                                                                                      
 123. Although beyond the scope of this Article, Verkerke actually does find one 
difference in his logit analysis for Michigan, id. at 881, and he offers a possible 
explanation. Id. at 868. 
 124. Interestingly, Verkerke offers some crosstabulation data that could suggest a 
normative preference for at will as opposed to just cause when examining the subset of 
employers who did sink the transaction costs to write contracts in these two jurisdictions. 
Id. at 881. 
 125. A signaling argument is indirectly supported by the frequency of just-cause 
provisions in collective bargaining agreements. If the relative rarity of just-cause 
contractual protection for nonunion employees is explained by the negative signal that a 
request for such a term would send, then by corollary, the muting or masking of a signal 
that is conveyed by a bargaining unit of a union rather than an exposed, individual 
employee might explain why the term gets proposed (and accepted) more in the unionized 
employee context. 
 126. Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market 
and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958 (1996). 
 127. Verkerke, supra note 116, at 903. 
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cancelled out, in Verkerke’s estimation, by the employer’s equally 
negative signal by refusal to accede. 
 Even leaving aside assumptions regarding bargaining power, it is 
not clear that a signaling explanation can be so easily dismissed. To 
say that the signals cancel each other out misses somewhat the nature 
of signaling effects. Rather than neutralizing each other, it is equally 
plausible that the employee’s and the employer’s concerns about 
negative inferences will compound one another in a vicious cycle, with 
the employee worrying about the employer’s propensity to discharge 
summarily by insisting on at will and the employer worrying about the 
employee’s work ethic by insisting on just cause.128 Error can 
sometimes accrue rather than cancel. Thus, regardless whether one 
believes that Verkerke’s employment contracting pattern data tell a 
story about negative signaling, they certainly do tell a story about 
sticky defaults in the nonunion labor market. 
 Outside the United States, additional, more tentative evidence for 
the stickiness of labor defaults can be marshaled. This is done by 
considering a country, such as Canada, that has different labor 
default rules. In contrast to the American legal baseline of 
employment at will, Canada (at least in its most populous province of 
Ontario) effectively employs a common law default of dismissal only 
for cause.129 The Canadian experience is complicated somewhat by 
the statutory overlay upon the common law of the Employment 
Standards Act (ESA), which prescribes certain employee-protection 
terms that cannot be waived by contract.130 Nevertheless, the overall 
structure seems to be the reverse of the American system. To be sure, 
describing the employment baseline in Canada as just cause is an 
apt, but not perfect, analogy, because employers technically retain 
ultimate discretion to terminate an employee’s job unilaterally for 
any nondiscriminatory reason. But the just-cause rule can be seen as 
the effective default in Canada, because notwithstanding their 
nominal rights to dismiss an employee unilaterally, employers are 
required to pay “termination” or “notice” payments if they choose to 
dismiss an employee without just-cause.131 These default common 
law termination entitlements of an employee may be raised or 
lowered by contract as employers and employees see fit. The ESA, 
                                                                                                                      
 128. Kamiat shares this critique of Verkerke’s conclusions. Kamiat, supra note 126, at 
1962 n.15. 
 129. Employment Standards Act, S.O. 2000, ch. 41, § 54 (Can.), available at 
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Statutes/English/00e41_e.htm. 
 130. Id. § 5.  
 131. Id. § 61 (stating that an employee dismissed without notice and cause is entitled 
to minimum payments under the common law). These payments vary widely and case-by-
case, based upon factors such as duration of employment. See John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A 
Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating Employment Arbitration Agreements in the 
United States and Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1007, 1029-30 (2002). 
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however, sets a minimum level of termination benefits below which 
private parties may not contract out, that is, a mandatory norm at 
the lower extreme.132 Thus, although employees can contract out of 
just-cause protection (or, more specifically, contract to waive their 
termination entitlements at common law), their range of waiver gets 
truncated by a statutory floor.133 
 As a generalization, then, it is fair to say that Canada follows the 
reverse legal default from the United States: an effective rule of 
termination for just cause. Being a default rule, employees are free to 
request or agree to greater or fewer termination benefits as inclined. 
If the American at-will rule were more efficient, one would expect 
Canadian employees to offer and Canadian employers to seek 
waivers of the just-cause protections to the maximal extent allowed 
by the ESA in return for higher compensation. 
 Here, we were able to collect only anecdotal impressions from 
Canadian labor lawyers, but they consistently suggest the same 
trend of prevalent “noncontracting” that exists under the American 
experience. In the words of one Canadian lawyer:  
 Although there is certainly a trend that we advise our 
[employer] clients to try more to reduce employment conditions to 
contract—and we are starting to see a bit more of that—the vast 
majority don’t have any contracts at all—[they are] relying on the 
statutory and common law entitlements. In fact, most ‘contracts’ 
for employment consist entirely of a one-page offer letter saying, 
“Congratulations, please report to your first day of work on this 
day at this pay.”134  
Further consistent with the American data, the Canadian anecdotal 
experience of labor lawyers is that if any trend exists, it is that 
larger, more sophisticated companies are the most likely employers 
to draft contracts for employment, with the smaller ones relying 
upon default law.135 
 While it could, of course, be a comparative socio-legal 
phenomenon—that the Canadians are simply “different” in their 
                                                                                                                      
 132. See MCMILLAN BINCH MENDELSOHN, LLP, EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CANADA 4 (2004), http:// 
www.mcbinch.com/Upload/Publication/MBM_ACLF_Employment%20Law%20in%20Canada.pdf. 
 133. To be clear, though, all of these termination benefits in Canada are for dismissal 
“without cause.” By contrast, if an employer meets a relatively stringent test for dismissal 
“for cause,” then the notice benefits need not be paid under either the common law or the 
ESA; they are effectively forfeited. See id. at 5-6. “Cause,” under the common law, is again 
highly contextual and varies from employee to employee, depending on numerous factors. 
See id. at 5. 
 134. Telephone Interview with Nadine Côté, Associate, Torys LLP, in Toronto, Can. 
(Feb. 2, 2005). 
 135. Id. 
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legal preferences from their American counterparts136—we just as 
easily can conclude that there is an explanation finding its roots in 
the reluctance to deviate from the standard legal default. Moreover, 
it cannot simply be a story of transaction costs, because a one-page 
letter in Canada can just as effortlessly become a one-and-a-quarter-
page letter, with a further sentence setting by contract the 
termination benefits. Yet, just as with the American experience, we 
see a persistent stickiness of the default rule. 
C.   The Stickiness of Boilerplates 
 Another example of the stickiness phenomenon is found in the 
drafting of boilerplates. Complex transactions are often governed by 
industry-standard boilerplate terms, which vary little, if at all, across 
contracts. What happens when the default interpretation of such a 
boilerplate term changes, say, as a result of an external interpretive 
shock? For example, what happens if an unexpected court ruling 
interprets a standard term in a different (or, if possible, completely 
opposite) way from the traditional understanding? Does the new 
interpretation stick, or will parties redraft the boilerplate term to 
return to the original intended meaning?  
 A recent example arose in the context of sovereign bond contracts, 
as discussed in a working paper by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati.137 
Studying the restructuring consent terms of sovereign bond contracts 
(the provisions that determine what fraction of the creditors must 
approve a change in the credit terms), the authors identify a large 
sector of the market that traditionally used one type of provision, a 
“unanimous consent” clause.138 This clause requires, as its name 
implies, the approval of all creditors for a workout refinancing. In a 
landmark event in 2000, a sovereign debtor was able to modify a 
contract with a unanimous consent clause without, in fact, acquiring 
unanimous approval from the bondholders by invoking another 
provision in the contract.139 This shocked the market—doubtless, it 
                                                                                                                      
 136. There is actually some weak evidence for this. In the telephone interview of 
Nadine Côté, Ms. Côté said that there is a “social justice” sense behind the minimum 
employment standard for termination benefits under the ESA, and that the no-contracting-
out provision has been likened in case law to being similar to a prohibition against 
contracting out of a speed limit: its absence would be flatly inconsistent with deep norms of 
public policy. Id. 
 137. See G. Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, What Drives Changes in Boilerplate 
Contracts (Oct. 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
CentersAndPrograms/olin/papers/Fall%202004/Gulati.pdf [hereinafter Gulati & Choi, 
Boilerplate Contracts]; see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Contract as Statute]. 
 138. See Gulati & Choi, Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 137, at 5. 
 139. See Choi & Gulati, Contract as Statute, supra note 137. The complementary 
provision, known as “exit consent,” applied to early payment terms. The 2000 court 
decision was an “interpretive shock” because it allowed the (non-unanimous) exit consent 
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shocked the creditors who held unanimous consent clause bonds.140 
Did the surprised creditors immediately insist upon amendments to 
their bonds to shore up the unanimous consent protection that they 
thought they had? Did issuers who drafted subsequent bonds revise 
the language of the contract to clarify that unanimous consent is 
required for modification? 
 No. Choi and Gulati found that, although many investors initially 
grumbled about this new interpretation, there was no massive opt-
out of the new default and no redrafting of the boilerplate language 
in the contracts.141 The default text of the boilerplate remained the 
same. The default, even when its legal content changed by deus ex 
machina, remained sticky. The empirical tests conducted by Choi 
and Gulati indicate that the use of the default boilerplate is “a 
reflection of the standardized nature of such terms and the 
‘stickiness’ inherent in changing such terms.”142 Specifically, they 
argue that the lack of immediate shift back to the pre-shock 
arrangement provides evidence for the stickiness hypothesis (or the 
“lock-in” effect, as they call it in this context).143 
 Interestingly, Choi and Gulati also found a secondary effect: 
although no country changed its boilerplate language initially, there 
was, eventually, a follow-up effect, but only after three years. After 
this substantial time lag, a renegade country, Mexico, went out on a 
limb and altered the consent term to match expressly the meaning 
that the court applied. This departure from the old boilerplate 
language opened the floodgates, where other countries felt it was 
acceptable, then, to redraft their consent clauses.144 This follow-up 
provides support for the shifting nature of deviance costs mentioned 
above. Once those costs are borne by “a pioneer,” future opt-outs 
produce less anxiety as instances of deviance become familiar. In 
such circumstances, the stickiness norm will erode and the 
opportunity widens for innovation and surplus enhancement through 
private legal tailoring. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Imagine the following scenario. You are looking to buy a new 
component for your computer (say, a wireless router). You log onto 
                                                                                                                      
clause to override the unanimous consent clause. Gulati & Choi, Boilerplate Contracts, 
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 140. See Choi & Gulati, Contract as Statute, supra note 137. 
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eBay and type the model number into the search bar. To your 
delight, hundreds of items are auctioned. They are all very similar in 
description and are sold by sellers of varying reputations. You are 
getting ready to bid on one of these routers, the maximal value of 
which to you is $50, when you notice that one of the offers is a bit 
different. This offer is identical in every respect to the others—the 
same router model, the same description, the same shipping costs—
but it includes an additional element. In a conspicuous fashion, the 
seller announces that the winner of the auction will receive, apart 
from the router, a handsome prize: a box of fancy chocolates. Indeed, 
in the auction page, the seller includes a picture of chocolate. Will 
you bid more than $50 for this auction? Will you bid less? 
 This Article posits that it is very plausible to expect that you will 
bid less than $50, even if you like chocolate. True, the direct value of 
this auction is increased by bundling the router with a non-zero 
value chocolate.145 But there is also an indirect effect on the 
valuation, which may be negative. You have never seen anything 
before like this on eBay—nobody who sells computer parts bundles 
them with chocolate. While the bundling itself does not provide any 
direct indication that something might be wrong with the router, the 
fact that this deviation is so uncommon may raise your suspicion 
that the seller is trying to trick you, and other potential buyers, into 
a transaction that you will later regret. The bundling of chocolate 
into the transaction, being such an unfamiliar practice, may scare 
you away by raising a host of “unknown” worries you had not 
originally perceived. So while there is nothing wrong with such 
bundling—in fact, it should increase the value of the sale to the 
buyer—it may never be offered. 
 This same intuition underlies the thesis of this Article. It is 
sometimes cheap and desirable to offer terms that differ from the 
default rules or the standard terms used in the market. But the 
proposal of new and otherwise unfamiliar terms may also raise 
suspicions and scare away potential counterparties. Default rules 
and the standard boilerplate terms may stick more than we think, 
and more than they should. 
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